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January 1, 2026—The year 2025 ended on a really positive note in many respects! Most recently, on December 23, 2025, the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court (301 OAus 173/24) finally ruled that the long-contested extradition of a defendant wanted by Italy was inadmissible.
To say this was a long-fought battle is really no exaggeration. In the same case, I had already successfully challenged the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court’s detention orders of December 17, 2024, and January 3, 2025, before the Federal Constitutional Court in early 2025 (BVerfG, Decision of January 23, 2025 – 2 BvR 05/25), and then it took almost the entire year for the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court to finally render its decision (“Extradition inadmissible”).
The decision no longer came as a surprise to me, but it is worth reading because the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart has pioneered the identification and presentation of the minimum requirements for a European Arrest Warrant. The investigating judge from Naples could not circumvent these minimum requirements with the extradition request.
Key concepts played a role, such as the observance of the principle of specialty, the nature and legal characterization of the offense in the European Arrest Warrant, a sufficiently precise description of the offense and the circumstances under which the alleged offense was committed—including the time, place, and nature of the wanted person’s involvement in the offense—as well as heightened requirements for extradition documents and subsequent clarification of the factual account. A central concept in the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court’s reasoning is the review of the plausibility of the description of the offense in the European Arrest Warrant, which, although it ranks significantly below the much-discussed so-called “review of reasonable suspicion” in extradition proceedings in terms of requirements, is, in my opinion, far superior to it in terms of practical significance.
The review of the formal admissibility requirements for extradition—which the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart is required to conduct ex officio—has revealed that the European Arrest Warrant issued by the Court of Naples (Division of Investigating Judges) does not meet the formal requirements applicable in this context.
Looking back at the year 2025 as a whole, it has once again become clear to me what an important role the constitutional complaint filed by the defense lawyer plays in extradition proceedings. A constitutional complaint filed with the Federal Constitutional Court is the last legal remedy available to those facing extradition once the Higher Regional Court has declared the extradition admissible. In my opinion, the prospects for success of constitutional complaints in extradition proceedings are better than the general statistics suggest. Right at the start of 2025, I had a successful constitutional complaint in an extradition case, followed by several cases in which the mere filing of a constitutional complaint led the Higher Regional Courts to revise their admissibility decisions even before the Federal Constitutional Court had to rule. The Schleswig-Holstein Higher Regional Court (1 OAus 39/25) rejected an extradition to Poland after constitutional complaint. That had previously been declared admissible. Following the filing of a constitutional complaint, the Nuremberg Higher Regional Court revised a previous decision on admissibility (extradition to Turkey), so that the Federal Constitutional Court ultimately did not have to rule on the matter either.
And in 2025, there were also several cases in which extradition was denied either at the level of the State Attorney General’s Office or, at the latest, by the Higher Regional Court. For example, based on a thorough defense, the Munich Higher Regional Court declared extradition to Turkey inadmissible due to the enforcement of a total sentence exceeding 20 years (10 AuS 257/24).
Several of our clients were released from extradition detention. In an extradition proceeding in Düsseldorf (GenStA 4 AuslA 223/25), we identified alternatives to extradition; in Munich (1 OAus 219/25), an asylum proceeding from France helped our client secure the revocation of the extradition detention warrant and subsequently the termination of the extradition proceedings. The Hanseatic Higher Regional Court of Hamburg (Ausl 31/25) rejected the extradition detention order requested by the Hamburg State Prosecutor’s Office because, despite the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), there was no risk of flight.
Even in 2025, it wasn’t all sunshine and roses. The numerous extradition requests from Ukraine posed a problem in 2025. But I am not giving up hope, even though the status quo in German Higher Regional Courts remains that the extradition of persecuted individuals to Ukraine does not appear inadmissible from the outset. After all, in many cases, a stay of execution of extradition warrants was achieved, and the Higher Regional Courts are confronting Ukrainian law enforcement authorities with extensive lists of questions regarding conditions there.
Many extradition proceedings from 2025 (particularly those involving Belgium, Croatia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, as well as extradition to South Korea, Ukraine, and Hungary) are still ongoing. My experience is that successful proceedings—in which extradition is ultimately rejected as inadmissible—often take a long time.
Under German extradition law, the concept of an “unbearably harsh punishment” („unerträglich harte Strafe“) serves as a ground for refusing extradition. This means that the extradition of a person to another country may be refused if the person sought faces an unbearably harsh punishment in that requesting country. Specifically, this refers to a punishment that is not only more severe than what would be imposed in Germany for a comparable offense, but so unbearably severe that—according to several decisions by the German Federal Constitutional Court—it appears disproportionate from every conceivable perspective. This follows from the constitutional principle of proportionality, which is - just as in many other countries - one of the indispensable constitutional principles in Germany (BVerfG Decision of December 20, 2014 – 2 BvR 1820/14).
German Courts must also ensure that the extradition and the underlying proceedings are compatible with the minimum standard of international law—which is binding under Article 25 of the German Basic Law—and with the indispensable constitutional principles. Under ordinary law, Section 73, Sentence 1 of the International Extradition Act (IRG) declares extradition inadmissible if it would contradict essential principles of the German legal order—in particular, the principle of proportionality.
Even knowing all this, however, one still lacks a clear, easy-to-apply standard for determining when the expected punishment is unbearably harsh. And no matter how hard one tries, this easy-to-apply standard is not pure mathematics.
In extradition proceedings, however, I have repeatedly encountered challengeable court decisions that give the impression of merely pointing out constitutional principles without even attempting to establish a clear standard for what constitutes an “unbearably harsh punishment.”
In any case, one can certainly expect a court in Germany that decides on the admissibility of extradition to set forth comprehensible criteria in its decision. A prerequisite for this is that the court determine the specific expected sentence in its own country, ascertain the specific expected sentence in the requesting state, and compare the two (BVerfG, Decision of Nov. 20, 2014 – 2 BvR 1820/14). In extradition proceedings in Germany, the principle of ex officio investigation applies (see BVerfGE 60, 348, 358; BVerfGK 18, 63, 73), and this includes the determination of the expected penalty in both states. In my opinion, the determination of the expected penalty in both states is also indispensable for the courts’ own self-review. Or, to put it another way, if a thorough determination of the expected penalty in both states does not take place, the balancing of interests regarding an intolerably harsh penalty rests on shaky ground.
Some courts, which forgo a firm foundation, are quick to cite the Federal Constitutional Court’s case law, according to which the Basic Law assumes Germany’s integration into the international legal order of the community of states, such that the structures and content of foreign legal systems and legal views must generally be respected, even if they do not correspond in every detail to domestic views (see BVerfGE 113, 154, 162 et seq.). However, this only permits respecting penalties that are higher than those that would apply in Germany for the same offense; it does not permit abandoning all upper limits, nor does it permit foregoing the determination of the specific expected penalty in one’s own country and the ascertainment of the specific expected penalty in the requesting state, and the comparison of the two. The Federal Constitutional Court (see BVerfG, Decision of June 24, 2003—2 BvR 685/03—) requires, rather, a balancing test that must identify the basis for that balancing. Then one can still argue—according to the Federal Constitutional Court—that the German understanding of the law is not the sole determining factor in this balancing test.
Furthermore, in light of the rule of law enshrined in Art. 1, para. 1 GG and Art. 20, para. 3 GG, it is one of the indispensable principles of the German constitutional order that a punishment must not be cruel, inhuman, or degrading (BVerfG Decision of November 20, 2014 - 2 BvR 1820/14; BVerfG Decision of March 31, 1987 - 2 BvM 2/86 - BVerfGE 75, 1), which also confirms that the views of a requesting state with a different perspective cannot be the sole determining factor.
A reality of German extradition proceedings is that the German Higher Regional Courts—with regard to the “unbearably harsh punishment” in the requesting state—generally take a stance favorable to extradition. However, my experience is that the tide can turn if, during judicial extradition proceedings, one can convince the Higher Regional Court that it must thoroughly clarify the expected sentence in the requesting state and compare it to conditions in Germany. I gained this experience early on with a Higher Regional Court that subsequently made detailed inquiries to the requesting state regarding the expected sentence and the circumstances of the anticipated enforcement of the sentence, and which, in several published decisions thereafter, declared extradition inadmissible due to the expected intolerably harsh sentence.
If there are indications that the alleged offense and the foreseeable legal consequences are disproportionate in the specific case, the competent Higher Regional Court must, in accordance with the principle of ex officio investigation, determine and compare the specific expected sentence in its own country and in the requesting state, while also taking into account the circumstances of the enforcement of the sentence. To this end, statements from the foreign judicial authorities must also be obtained regarding the points mentioned. And in my experience, these are often shockingly candid and honest, leading to the inadmissibility of extradition due to an intolerably harsh sentence.
Our firm maintains a 24 Hour Emergency Line +49(0)172-2112373 or +49(0)172-7056055
Rechtsanwälte Dr. Martin Rademacher & Lars Horst, LL. M. - Germany